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Abstract: 
 
This paper considers a trade situation where the production activities of potentially 
heterogeneous countries generate pollution which can cross borders and harm the well-being of 
all the countries involved. In each of those countries the policy market levies pollution taxes on 
the polluting firms and a tariff on imports in order to correct that distortion. The purpose of the 
paper is to investigate the effect of a reduction in the tariff on equilibrium pollution taxes and 
welfare. The existing literature has investigated this problem for trade between two identical 
countries. This paper analyzes the problem in the more realistic context where countries are not 
necessarily identical and trade can be multilateral. It becomes possible to show what bias is 
introduced when those two realities are neglected. I find that a tariff reduction can actually 
lower output; it can also lower welfare even if pollution is purely local. 
 
Keywords: Trade liberalization, Pollution taxes, Transboundary pollution, Heterogeneous 
countries, Imperfect markets 
 
 
Résumé:  
 
Ce papier s’inscrit dans un contexte où les activités de production des pays potentiellement 
hétérogènes génèrent de la pollution qui peut traverser les frontières et nuire au bien-être des 
pays impliqués. Dans chacun de ces pays, l’état s’impose des taxes sur la pollution aux firmes 
polluantes et des tarifs à l’importation afin de corriger cette distorsion. Ce papier a pour but 
d’évaluer les effets que pourrait avoir une diminution des tarifs douaniers sur la production, les 
taxes sur la pollution et le bien-être de ces pays. La littérature existante a étudié ce problème, 
mais seulement dans le cadre d’un commerce bilatéral entre pays identiques. Cet article fournit 
un cadre d’analyse plus réaliste dans lequel les pays ne seront pas nécessairement identiques et 
où le commerce pourra être multilatéral. Il devient alors possible de mettre en évidence le biais 
introduit en négligeant ces deux facteurs. Dans ce nouveau contexte, je montre qu’une 
réduction des tarifs d’importation n’augmente pas nécessairement l’output; elle peut aussi 
nuire au bien-être, même si la pollution est purement locale. 
Mots clés: Libéralisation du commerce, taxes sur la pollution, pollution transfrontalière, pays 
hétérogènes, marchés imparfaits 
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1 Introduction
There is a growing concern among environmentalists about the negative effects of freer
international trade on environment. The central point is that competitive pressures incurred
by freer trade may oblige governments to dilute their environmental instrument. What is
unfortunate is that despite the large difference among countries, papers that investigate the
impact of trade liberalization on pollution taxes and welfare work only under the restrictive
assumption of identical countries. However, we frequently observe that ”small” countries
trade with ”big” partners. In such situations, taking into account the trade structure is
important to best characterize the equilibrium.
The goal of this paper is to examine how a reduction in trade barriers between potentially
heterogenous open economies affects their environmental policies. Specifically, we consider
a finite number of trading countries divided into two groups. Countries are identical within
each group but differ between groups by the number of firms in their industry. We assume
that in each country production entails pollution and that a fraction of pollution emitted
in the country flows into the other countries. The governments use tariffs on imports and
pollution taxes in order to correct the distortion created by this global pollution. We are
interested in how, in this context, a tariff reduction can affect the equilibrium output, the
equilibrium pollution taxes and the equilibrium social welfare.
The problem described above will be modeled as an oligopolistic trade game where the
tariff will be assumed to be the same for all the countries. In a first stage, in each country, the
relevant authority chooses unilaterally the pollution tax that maximizes the social welfare
of the country. In a second stage, given the tariff on export and the pollution tax rates,
each firm decides how much to produce for the home market and how much for the foreign
market.
A number of studies have examined the issue of global pollution in an international
oligopolistic setting. Among them, Barrett (1994), Kennedy (1994) and Markusen (1975)
ask how strategic environmental policies compared to the first best outcome. Their com-
mon result is that the pollution taxes set unilaterally are in general not socially optimal.
Those studies assume free trade and identical countries in their analysis. In this paper, we
relax these two assumptions and focus on the analysis of the effects of multilateral-trade
liberalization on equilibrium pollution taxes, equilibrium output and equilibrium welfare of
countries.
The model used is closely related to that of Burguet and Sempere (2003) and to that of
Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009). Burguet and Sempere (2003) explore the impacts of a uniform
tariff reduction on welfare and environmental policy. They show that a bilateral tariff reduc-
tion can affect environmental policy through two channels. First, they find that a bilateral
tariff reduction always increases output which in turn lowers price and increases marginal
damages of output. This incites governments to raise their environmental protection level
by increasing the pollution taxes. Second, a bilateral tariff reduction diminishes revenues
from imports and reduces the cost of exports, hence encouraging governments to dilute their
environmental protection. The net effect of a tariff reduction on environmental policy de-
pends on which channel outweighs the other. They also show that when the environmental
policy is a pollution tax, a bilateral tariff reduction always improves welfare. The limitations
of that paper are that it considers only bilateral trade between identical countries, with a
monopoly in each country, and considers local pollution only.
Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009) extend that paper to an arbitrary number of firms in each
of the two trading countries and also allow for many types of pollution. On the one hand,
they show that trade liberalization always increases the output level in each country. It also
increases the pollution tax when pollution is sufficiently harmful. On the other hand, they
find that trade liberalization always improves social welfare when pollution is purely local.
In this paper, as in Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009), we consider varying degree of spillover
of pollution to other countries, going from purely local pollution to totally global pollution.
However, our approach is more general in some key respects: there is an arbitrary number of
countries involved in trade; there is an arbitrary number of countries divided into two groups
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according to the number of firms in their industry; the number of countries in each group
can differ. We focus on the impacts of this type of asymmetry on multilateral environmental
policies.
To do this, we derive the Nash equilibrium pollution taxes, the equilibrium output and the
equilibrium social welfare. We examine the effects of a tariff reduction on these equilibrium
outcomes and compare them with those obtained when all the countries are identical. In
particular, we compare the results related to the situation in which two types of trading
partners coexist on the world market with the one where all trading partners are identical.
Unlike the case of identical countries in which trade liberalization always increases output,
two situations may arise when the two types of countries coexist. Trade liberalization may
increase output of the countries in one group while lowering output of the countries in the
other group. It may also increase the output of all the countries. As in Baksi and Chaudhuri
(2009), we find that in the identical countries setting, trade liberalization increases the
pollution taxes when the pollution is sufficiently harmful. Moreover, social welfare is concave
in the trade tariff and trade liberalization always increases social welfare when the pollution
is purely local. However, in the presence of asymmetry, these results may not hold, depending
on the range of asymmetry and the number of actors involved in trade.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out and solves the
model. Section 3 presents the outcomes of the model obtained with identical countries.
Section 4 compares the results of the asymmetric model to those derived with identical
countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a world of N ≥ 1 countries, divided into two groups. Countries are identical within
each group but differ between groups by the number of firms in their industry. The first
group is made of N1 countries and the industry of each country in that group has n1 firms.
The second group is constituted of N2 countries and each country in that group has n2 firms.
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Industries are assumed to produce a homogenous good. They use the same technology of
production and c is their constant unit cost of production.
A single firm that resides in country j produces and ships quantity yij of the good to the
market of country i. For simplicity, there is not storage. Firms compete in quantities in
the market of their own country and in each foreign market, like in the reciprocal dumping
game by Brander and Krugman (1983). The inverse demand is the same for countries in
both groups and is given by
P (yi) = a− yi; a > c, (1)
where yi denotes the total quantity demanded in country i.
Each country levies a tariff z on each unit of import from foreign countries. The tariff is
exogenous and is the same in both groups of countries. Multilateral trade liberalization is
defined as a uniform reduction of the tariff in the N countries.1
During their activity of production, firms emit pollution that damages a shared environ-
mental resource. It is assumed that one unit of production generates one unit of pollution
and that pollution is transboundary. We denote by a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of
pollution emitted in one country that damages the other countries with λ = 0 being strictly
local pollution and λ = 1 being perfectly global pollution.
The damage cost function from the pollution of country j is assumed to be quadratic,
convex, and increasing in the pollution level:
Dj =
γ
2

yj + λ ∑
k∈N1\{j}
yk + λ
∑
k∈N2\{j}
yk


2
,
where γ ≥ 0 is the damage cost parameter and, for all k = 1, ..., N ,
yk = ni
∑
i1∈N1
yi1k + ni
∑
i2∈N2
yi2k , (2)
is the total output produced in country k; where, i = 1 if k ∈ N1 and i = 2 if k ∈ N2.
1This situation prevails for instance in NAFTA where member countries are asked to diminish uniformly
their trade tariff over a defined calendar of time.
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The environmental instrument in each country is a pollution tax imposed by its govern-
ment to its domestic firms. Denote by ti the pollution tax per unit of pollution in country
i.
In a first stage, the relevant authority in each country decides the tax level that maximizes
the country’s social welfare considering as given the tax level of the remaining countries. It
also considers the common tariff z (per unit of export) in both groups of country as given.
In a second stage, each firm decides the output level that maximizes its profits. In that
decision, it considers the output level of the remaining n1N1 + n2N2− 1 firms and the set of
taxes in both groups of countries as given. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived
using backward induction.
2.1 The second stage of the game: output decision of firms
The typical firm that operates in country j chooses the output strategy {yij}i=Ni=1 that maxi-
mizes its profit, namely:
max
{yij}
i=N
i=1
N∑
i=1
yij(a− yi)−
N∑
i=1,i 6=j
zyij − (c+ tj)
N∑
i=1
yij, (3)
where
yi = n1
∑
j1∈N1
yij1 + n2
∑
j2∈N2
yij2 (4)
denotes the total quantity sold in country i, for i = 1, ..., N .
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions for this problem are:
a− yi − yij = z + c+ tj , ∀i 6= j (5a)
a− yj − yjj = c+ tj , ∀j = 1, ..., N. (5b)
Define the home (export) augmented marginal cost as the marginal cost c plus tax tj
(marginal cost c plus tax tj and tariff z). The left-hand sides of (5a) and (5b) are respectively
marginal revenue from export and from domestic sales. These fist-order conditions say that
a given firm allocates for export (home) the output level for which the marginal revenue
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of production for export (home) equals to its export (home) augmented marginal cost of
production.
For later reference, we calculate in what follows the equilibrium output and consumption
for each country. Solving the system of equations (4), (5a) and (5b), we obtain the total
sales of the good for country i1 in the first group:
yi1 = [(n1N1 + n2N2)(a− c)− z(n1(N1 − 1) + n2N2)− n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 − n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2]/d, (6a)
where d = 1+n1N1+n2N2. Using a similar reasoning, we verify that total sales of the good
for country i2 in the second group is:
yi2 = [(n1N1 + n2N2)(a− c)− z(n1N1 + n2(N2 − 1))− n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 − n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2 ]/d. (6b)
Using (6a) and (6b) we get: yi1 − yi2 = z(n1 − n2), which is positive if and only if n1 > n2.
Thus, in the case of pure asymmetry (n1 6= n2), each country in the group which has the
largest number of firms consumes more than a country in the other group.
Substituting (6a) into (5b), we get the quantity produced and consumed in country i of
the first group:
yii = −ti+{a− c+ z[(N1−1)n1+n2N2]+n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 +n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2}/(1+n1N1+n2N2). (6c)
Similarly, substituting (6b) into (5b), we obtain the output level produced and consumed in
country i of the second group:
yii = −ti+{a− c+z[n1N1+(N2−1)n2]+n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 +n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2}/(1+n1N1+n2N2). (6d)
Now, substituting (6a) into (5a), we derive the quantity of the good produced by a firm in
country j and shipped to country i of the first group:
yij = −tj+{a−c−(1+n1)z+n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1+n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2}/(1+n1N1+n2N2), for all j 6= i. (6e)
Substituting (6b) into (5a) yields the quantity of the good produced by a firm in a given
country j and shipped to a given country i belonging to the second group:
yij = −tj+{a−c−(1+n2)z+n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1+n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2}/(1+n1N1+n2N2), for all j 6= i. (6f)
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Substituting (6c)-(6f) in (2), we get the total output produced by a country j1 in the
first group:
yj1 = −n1Ntj1 + n1N(a− c)/d− (N − 1)n1z/d + n1N [n1
∑
j∈N1
tj + n2
∑
j∈N2
tj]/d. (6g)
Likewise, plugging (6c)-(6f) in (2) we obtain the total output produced by a country j2 in
the second group which is given by:
yj2 = −n2Ntj2 + n2N(a− c)/d− (N − 1)n2z/d + n2N [n1
∑
j∈N1
tj + n2
∑
j∈N2
tj]/d. (6h)
From (6g) and (6h) we observe that while an exogenous increase of the national tax always
lowers national production, an exogenous increase of the foreign taxes raises the national
production.
Each country’s net import is the difference between its total consumption and its total
production. Using (6a), (6b), (6g) and (6h), we derive the expressions for the net import of
each country in the first and in the second group, which are respectively given by:
yi1 − yi1 = n1Nti1 − (1 + n1N)[n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 + n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2]/d+ (a− c− z)N2(n2 − n1)/d,
yi2 − yi2 = n2Nti2 − (1 + n2N)[n1
∑
j1∈N1
tj1 + n2
∑
j2∈N2
tj2]/d+ (a− c− z)N1(n1 − n2)/d.
In each country, the net import is increasing in its own pollution tax and is decreasing
in the foreign pollution tax. Note that in the case of symmetric industry size (n1 = n2),
the net import does not depend on the tariff. However, in the case of asymmetric industry
sizes (n1 6= n2), the net imports of countries with higher industry size are affected nega-
tively by a tariff reduction, while the reverse is true for countries with the lower industry
size. This is the extension to asymmetry of a result by Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009) and
Burguet and Sempere (2003). Recall that both papers investigate the effects of a tariff re-
duction on the optimal pollution tax for two identical trading countries. They find, among
other things that the net import of each country does not depend on the trade tariff.
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2.2 First stage: environmental policy
In the first stage of the game, the government of each country chooses the pollution tax
that maximizes the country’s welfare, considering as given the tariff level and the pollution
tax of the other countries.2 Welfare for each country is the sum of the consumer surplus,
the producer surplus, the tariff revenue and the pollution tax revenue, minus the pollution
damage. Its expression for country j ∈ N1 ∪N2 is given by:3
SWj(tj , t−j, z) = CSj + PSj + TRj + ERj −Dj, (7a)
where
CSj =
∫ yj
0
p(x)dx− p(yj)yj is the consumer surplus,
PSj = nk
∑N
i=1 y
i
jp(y
i)− (c+ tj)yj − nkz
∑N
i=1,i 6=j y
i
j is the producer surplus,
TRj = zn1
∑
k1∈N1\{j}
yjk1 + zn2
∑
k2∈N2\{j}
yjk2 is the tariff revenue,
ERj = tjnk
∑
i1∈N1
yi1j + nktj
∑
i2∈N2
yi2j = tjyj is the pollution tax revenue, where the y
i
j, y
j
are given by (6a)-(6f), and where k = 1 if j ∈ N1 and k = 2 if j ∈ N2. Using these results,
Condition (7a) can be rewritten as
SWj(tj , t−j, z) =
∫ yj
0
p(x)dx+ [nk
N∑
i=1
yijp(y
i)− p(yj)yj] + z[yj − yj]− cyj −D(wj), (7b)
where wj = yj + λ
∑
k∈N1\{j}
yk + λ
∑
k∈N2\{j}
yk represents the total emissions discharged
in country j; D(x) = γx2/2 for all x ≥ 0 and where k = 1 if j ∈ N1 and k = 2 if j ∈ N2.
In Expression (7b), the first right-hand side term represents the gross (domestic) consumer
surplus. The second term represents the net balance of trade. That is, the total revenue of
exports for country j net of the value of imports.4 The third term is the net tariff revenue.
The last two terms represent the social cost of production.
The first-order conditions for the maximization of (7b) yield the best-response pollution
tax for country j. The expression for the equilibrium tax of country j, tj(t−j) that depends
2This results in a Nash equilibrium pollution tax which is not in general socially efficient as pointed out
by Kennedy (1994).
3In the expression SWj(tj , t−j), t−j represents the vector of taxes of the countries other than j.
4To see this, remark that
nk
∑
i∈N y
i
jp(y
i)− p(yj)yj = nk
∑
i∈N\{j} y
i
jp(y
i)− p(yj)[n1
∑
k1∈N1\{j}
y
j
k1
+ n2
∑
k2∈N2\{j}
y
j
k2
].
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on taxes of other countries and on parameters of the model. The second-order condition for
welfare maximization is verified since we have the following inequality:
∂2SWj
∂(tj)2
(tj , t−j, z) = Ak − γn2kN2[−1 +
nk(1− λ) + λ(n1N1 + n2N2)
1 + n1N1 + n2N2
]2 < 0, (7c)
where Ak = n
2
k[1 + 2(N1 +N2)(nk − 1− n1N1 − n2N2)]/(1 + n1N1 + n2N2)2 < 0, and where
k = 1 if j ∈ N1 and k = 2 if j ∈ N2.5
The tax policies at the equilibrium for the first group and the second group of countries
are given respectively by:6
t1 = [z(v1eˆ2 − e2vˆ1) + (a− c)(v2eˆ2 − e2vˆ2)]/(e1eˆ2 − e2eˆ1), (8a)
t2 = [z(vˆ1e1 − eˆ1v1) + (a− c)(vˆ2e1 − eˆ1v2)]/(e1eˆ2 − e2eˆ1), (8b)
where, ei, eˆi, vi, vˆi for all i = 1, 2 are given in the appendix. Hereafter we restrict our attention
to the set of parameters for which the equilibrium output and taxes are positive.
In each country, the equilibrium pollution tax results in the strategic interaction of five
sources of market failure. First, the rent capture effect that tends to lower the equilibrium
pollution tax. Since the market is imperfect, each government has the incentive to provide
an edge to its domestic firms so that they can gain more rent through their exports. Second,
the pollution-shifting effect increases the equilibrium pollution taxes as each country tends to
shift output and its associated pollution to the foreign countries.7 Third, the transboundary
externality effect that tends to lower the equilibrium pollution tax, as each country does not
care about the damages associated to its pollution on the well being of the other countries.
Notice that the last two effects vanish when the good is clean (γ = 0). The tariff may also
affect the equilibrium tax. Indeed, for any positive tariff z, countries collect revenues from
their imports and pay fees on their exports. Thus, they may have an incentive to substitute
5A1 < 0 indeed: in its expression, denote by g(n1) the quantity in square brackets. Since g
′(n1) =
2(N1+N2)(1−N1) ≤ 0 and g(1) = 1− 2(N1+N2)(N1+n2N2) < 0, it follows that g(n1) < 0 for all n1 ≥ 1.
Using a similar reasoning, we can show that A2 < 0.
6We show in the appendix how to derive the expressions of equilibrium taxes (8a) and (8b).
7The expression of the rent capture effect and the one of the pollution shifting effect are given in the
appendix.
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foreign production for local production and then increase the tax on local production. Finally,
the ”price effect” that makes prices to differ across groups also impacts the pollution taxes.
When asymmetry prevails, the consumption level varies across groups, and as a result,
according to (1), so does the price. Each low market price country will then have a greater
incentive to soften its environmental tax in order to gain foreign rents as compared to each
high market price country. This induces different rent capture effects across groups. Notice
that the price effect exists only in the presence of asymmetry.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
Setting in (8a) N1 = N , N2 = 0 and n1 = n, we get the tax level for the symmetric
equilibrium, which is given by:
ts =
(N − 1){1 + nN(1 + n)− γnN [1 + λ(N − 1)][1 + n(N − 1)(1− λ)]}z + τs
nN2[1 + n(N − 1) + γ(1 + λ(N − 1)) + n(N − 1)γ(1− λ2)] , (9)
where the subscript s stands for the symmetric equilibrium and where
τs = (a− c)N{n− 1− nN + γnN [1 + λ(N − 1)][1 + n(N − 1)(1− λ)]}.
Substituting (9) into (6g), we get the total production of each country when all the
countries are identical, given by:
ys =
(a− c)(1 + n(N − 1))− (N − 1)(1 + nN)z
N [1 + γ(1− λ+Nλ) + n(N − 1)(1 + γ(1− λ)(1 + λ(N − 1)))] . (10)
Since ys is linear in z and has a negative slope, a reduction of the tariff results in an increase
of the national production of each country.
3.1 Effect of tariff reduction on the equilibrium tax: the symmetric case
The effect of a tariff reduction on the pollution tax depends on how this reduction affects
each of the effects detailed above and the resulting interaction.
Using (9), we derive
∂ts
∂z
=
(N − 1){1 + nN(1 + n)− γnN [1 + λ(N − 1)][1 + n(N − 1)(1− λ)]}
nN2[1 + n(N − 1) + γ(1 + λ(N − 1)) + n(N − 1)γ(1− λ2)] . (11)
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Since the denominator of (11) is positive, the sign of that expression is the same as that of
its numerator. Solving the equation ∂ts
∂z
= 0 for the transboundary pollution parameter, λ,
we obtain two roots
λ = [γnN(N − 1)(1 + n(N − 2))−
√
∆]/(2n2γN(N − 1)2),
λ = [γnN(N − 1)(1 + n(N − 2)) +
√
∆]/(2n2γN(N − 1)2),
where
∆ = Nγ(n(N − 1))2(Nγ(1 + nN)2 − 4(1 + nN(1 + n))).
The above roots are real if and only if ∆ ≥ 0. This last condition is equivalent to
γ ≥ 4(1 + nN(1 + n))
N(1 + nN)2
≡ γ1
Furthermore λ ≥ 0 if and only if
γ ≤ 1 + nN(1 + n)
nN(1 + n(N − 1)) ≡ γ2
and λ ≤ 1 if and only if
γ ≤ 1 + nN(1 + n)
nN2
≡ γ3
These computations lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under symmetry, we have: (i) if γ < γ1 then
∂ts
∂z
> 0. When the damage
cost parameter is sufficiently small, multilateral trade liberalization lowers the equilibrium
pollution tax, regardless to the remaining feasible parameters of the model. (ii) If γ ∈ [γ1, γ2],
then ∂ts
∂z
> 0 if and only if λ ≤ λ or λ ≥ λ. (iii) if γ ∈ [γ2, γ3] , then ∂ts∂z > 0 if and only if
λ ≥ λ. (iv) if γ > γ3 then ∂ts∂z < 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Notice that the above thresholds of the damage cost parameter have the following fea-
tures. First they satisfy the inequalities γ3 ≥ γ2 ≥ γ1. They are also decreasing functions
in the N number of countries participating in trade. In addition, each of them goes to zero
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as N goes to infinity so that only case (iv) of Proposition 1 is likely to hold when each
γi goes to zero. As a result, for the symmetric equilibrium, when the number of countries
involved in trade becomes sufficiently large, multilateral trade liberalization is more likely
to increase the environmental pollution tax. The result (iv) in Proposition 1 can be seen
as the ”mitigation effect”. Indeed, it states that if the damages are too harmful, countries
must raise their environmental tax in response to a tariff reduction. This in turn will lower
the national production of the dirty good in each country (see, Equation 6g or Equation 6h).
The overall effect will be the mitigation of the damages incurred from the global pollution.
The intuition underlying the results of Proposition 1 is as follows. The tariff reduction
can either lower or increase the pollution tax depending on which of the two opposite forces
resulting from such a reduction outweighs the other. (i) By increasing output, the tariff
reduction lowers prices, raises environmental damages and reduces economic rents, inducing
tougher environmental policies. (ii) By lowering the revenue from imports and the tariff
cost on exports, the tariff reduction diminishes the incentive to substitute foreign output for
domestic production by raising the tax. This incentive tends to diminish the equilibrium
pollution tax.
3.2 Effect of tariff reduction on welfare: the symmetric case
Substituting (9) into (7b) yields SWs, the expression for the welfare of the typical country
in the symmetric setting that depends on the tariff z and the remaining parameters of the
model. Its derivative with respect to z is given by
∂SWs
∂z
=
(N − 1)2(1 + nN)2[(a− c)Nγλ(1− λ+Nλ)− z(1 + γ(1 + λ(N − 1))2)]
N2[−1 + γ(−1 + λ−Nλ)− n(N − 1)(1 + γ(1− λ)(1 + λ(N − 1)))]2 . (12)
Proposition 2 Under symmetry, there exists a tariff threshold zˆ ≡ (a−c)Nγλ[1+λ(N−1)]
1+γ[1+λ(N−1)]2
, under
which a tariff reduction lowers the well-being of each country. Above that threshold, a tariff
reduction improves the well-being (i.e.∂SWs
∂z
≤ 0 if and only if z ≥ zˆ).
To better understand the results of Proposition 2, remark that yj = y
j = ys for j =
1, ..., N , which implies that the second and the third right-hand side terms of (7b) vanish at
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the equilibrium. Consequently, the equilibrium social welfare can be rewritten as
SWs(z) ≡ SWj(tj(z), t−j(z), z) =
∫ ys
0
p(x)dx− cys −D(ws), (13)
where ws = ys(1 + λ(N − 1)) and where ys is defined by (10). Differentiating (13) with
respect to z yields
∂SWs
∂z
(z) =
∂ys
∂z
[p(ys)− c− (1 + λ(N − 1))D′(ws)].
Since ∂ys
∂z
< 0, this relation shows that a marginal tariff reduction increases welfare only
when the price is initially greater than the marginal social cost of production. Proposition 2
suggests that such a condition holds only when the initial tariff is sufficiently large.
In the case of purely local pollution, we have zˆ = 0, which by Proposition 2 implies
that a reduction of the tariff always increases the payoff of each country. Furthermore,
differentiating zˆ with respect to N , we get:
∂zˆ
∂N
= (a− c)Nγλ1 + (2N − 1)λ+ γ(1− λ)(1 + λ(N − 1))
2
[1 + γ(1 + λ(N − 1))2]2 > 0 for λγ > 0.
This inequality, combined with the results of Proposition 2, suggest that for a spillover
pollution problem, as the number of countries involved in trade increases, trade liberalization
is less likely to improve the well being of each country.
Notice that this section represents an immediate extension of Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009),
which analyze the particular case where N = 2. It serves as a benchmark for identifying
channels by which trade liberalization affect output, environmental policies and welfare. We
next investigate the role of asymmetry.
4 Effects of asymmetry
This section considers first the simple case of bilateral trade prevailing between country 1
and country 2 by allowing for the number of firms to differ across countries. Refer the former
to ”Home” and the latter to ”Foreign”. As we are interested in the effects of having the two
types of countries involved in trade rather than having all the countries identical, we start
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by deriving the equilibrium under asymmetry and compare it with the equilibrium under
the symmetric setting calculated in Section 3.
Studying variations of the pollution taxes in (8a) and (8b), for the case where N1 = N2 =
1, we get:
Proposition 3 Assume that pollution is perfectly transboundary i.e. λ = 1. (i) If 1 ≤ n1 ≤
n¯1(n2), then a bilateral tariff reduction lowers the pollution taxes in Home even if pollution
is harmful enough. (ii) If n1 > n¯1(n2), then the bilateral tariff reduction diminishes the
pollution taxes in Home if and only if
γ < γ¯ ≡ 2 + 2n
3
1 + n2(8 + 5n2) + 2n1n2(3 + n2) + n
2
1(1 + 4n2)
4[n1(4n1 + 5 + 2n2)− n2(3 + 2n2)] .
(iii) If n1 ≥ n˜1(n2), then the bilateral tariff reduction lowers the pollution taxes in Foreign
even if pollution is harmful enough. (iv) If n1 < n˜1(n2), the tariff reduction lowers the
pollution taxes in Foreign only when
γ < γ˜ ≡ 2 + n
2
2(n2 + 2) + n
2
1(5 + 2n2) + n1(8 + 6n2 + 4n
2
2)
4[n1(−2n1 + 2n2 − 3) + n2(5 + 4n2)] ,
where n˜1(n2) > n¯1(n2) ≥ 0 are defined in the appendix.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3 highlights a new strategic interaction prevailing in the presence of asym-
metry. Indeed, when all the countries are identical, the tariff reduction always lowers the
pollution taxes for sufficiently harmful pollution. However, in the presence of asymmetry,
the interaction of the price effect and the above mentioned forces lead to a reverse result.
As shown in the appendix, our analysis also suggests that when pollution is not perfectly
transboundary i.e. 0 ≤ λ < 1, a bilateral tariff reduction always increases the pollution taxes
when pollution is sufficiently harmful ( i.e. for γ sufficiently large).
We will next investigate the effect of a bilateral tariff reduction on output.
Proposition 4 Assume that pollution is perfectly transboundary. (i) The bilateral tariff
reduction raises output in Home only when 1 ≤ n1 < nˆ1(n2). (ii) The bilateral tariff reduction
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raises output in Foreign only when n1 > n˘1(n2), where nˆ1(n2) and n˘1(n2) are defined in the
appendix.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that contrary to the case where countries are identical, in the context
of perfectly transboundary pollution, a bilateral tariff reduction actually increases output in a
country and lowers the one of the other country for n1 satisfying 1 ≤ n1 < min(nˆ1(n2), n˘1(n2))
or n1 > max(nˆ1(n2), n˘1(n2)). It raises output in all countries if n1 ∈ (n˘1(n2), nˆ1(n2)). It
lowers output in all countries only when n1 ∈ (nˆ1(n2), n˘1(n2)).8
To gain the intuition underlying the results of Proposition 4, differentiating (6g) with
respect to z, we get: ∂y1
∂z
< 0 if and only if
∂t1
∂z
>
n2
1 + n2
.
∂t2
∂z
− 1
2(1 + n2)
. (14a)
Likewise, using (6h), we derive: ∂y2
∂z
< 0 if and only if
∂t2
∂z
>
n1
1 + n1
.
∂t1
∂z
− 1
2(1 + n1)
. (14b)
These results show that the bilateral tariff reduction may increase or lower output in a
country depending on how such a reduction affects the country’s pollution tax as compared
to that of the other country. When n1 is small and γ > γ˜, by the results (i) and (iv) of
Proposition 3, ∂t1
∂z
> 0 and ∂t2
∂z
< 0 so that by (14a), we have ∂y1
∂z
< 0. Likewise, when n1 is
large and γ > γ¯, results (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 suggest that ∂t1
∂z
< 0 and ∂t2
∂z
> 0, which
by (14b) imply that ∂y2
∂z
< 0. More generally, Conditions (14a) and (14b) read as follows: the
tariff reduction raises output for a country only when such a reduction generates an increase
in the pollution tax in that country greater than the one generated by such a reduction on
the pollution tax of the other country. The latter increase should be adjusted by the foreign
industry size. We provide a numerical example in the appendix in support to the above
results.
8Notice that depending on values of γ and n2, we can either have n˘1(n2) > nˆ1(n2) or nˆ1(n2) > n˘1(n2) or
nˆ1(n2) = n˘1(n2).
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The above findings suggest an interesting policy implication: the claim done by some
environmentalists that trade liberalization generates more pollution is not necessarily true.
However, it is important to mention that this result has been obtained in a particular context.
Namely, we consider for simplicity a constant pollution intensity (defined as pollution per
unit of output) and our analysis relies on specific preferences. We now investigate the effect
of a tariff reduction on welfare.
Denote by SW1(z) and SW2(z) the equilibrium welfare in Home and in Foreign, respec-
tively. What first clearly appears is that SW1(z) and SW2(z) are second degree polynomials
in z and they can be either concave or convex.
Indeed, substituting (8a) and (8b) into (6a)-(6f), we get the equilibrium values for y¯i, y¯i,
y¯pi produced by each country. Since the y¯
i, y¯i, y¯
p
i are linear in z, the particular quadratic
functional form of (7b) in y¯pi shows that SW1(z) and SW2(z) are second degree polynomials
in z. Moreover, for k = 1, 2, SWk is concave if and only if
∂2SWk
∂z2
(z) < 0. It is convex when
∂2SWk
∂z2
(z) > 0.
In order to give a support to the above results, consider the case where n1 = 1, n2 = 2 and
for arbitrary values of a, λ, γ and c. Whether SWk is concave or convex depends on values
of the spillover parameter and the damage cost parameter. Figure 1 and 2 in the appendix
illustrate these situations. For example, if λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0.3, 1) then SW1(z) and
SW2(z) are both concave. If λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 0.1) then SW1(z) is convex and SW2(z)
concave. In the symmetric model of Section 3, we have proved that the social welfare is
necessarily concave in the tariff z as in Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009). This simple example
shows that such is not the case in the presence of asymmetry.
Proposition 5 Let x¯k be the solution of the equation
∂SWk
∂z
(z) = 0 and z¯k = max(0, x¯k).
(i) When SWk is concave, we have
∂SWk
∂z
(z) < 0 if and only if z > z¯k. Trade liberalization
improves welfare in country k only when the initial tariff is large.
(ii) When SWk is convex, we have
∂SWk
∂z
(z) < 0 if and only if z < z¯k. Trade liberalization
increases welfare in country k only when the initial tariff is small.
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For the particular case where pollution is purely local (λ = 0) and where n1 = 1, n2 = 2,
and γ = 1, we get: ∂SW1
∂z
(z) > 0 if and only if z < 0.522(a − c) and ∂SW2
∂z
(z) > 0 if
and only if z < 0.39(a − c). These results imply that bilateral trade liberalization lowers
welfare of all the countries when the initial tariff is lower than 0.39(a − c). In addition, it
reduces welfare, but only in Home when the initial tariff lies in the open interval (0.39(a−
c), 0.522(a− c)). Recall that in the symmetric framework, as in Baksi and Chaudhuri (2009)
and Burguet and Sempere (2003), we have shown that trade liberalization always improves
welfare when pollution is purely local. This simple case highlights the limitation of such a
finding in the presence of asymmetry.
In order to better understand these results, notice that Home’s equilibrium social welfare
(7b) for the case where N1 = N2 = 1, can be rewritten as
SW1(z) =
∫ y¯1
0
p(x)dx+ [n1
2∑
i=1
y¯i1p(y¯
i)− p(y¯1)y¯1] + z[y¯1 − y¯1]− cy¯1 −D(w¯1), (15)
where w¯1 = y¯1+ λy¯2 and where y¯1, y¯2, y¯
1, y¯2 represent the equilibrium output and consump-
tion.
Differentiating (15) with respect to z yields
∂SW1
∂z
(z) = n1
2∑
i=1
(
∂y¯i1
∂z
p(y¯i) + y¯i1
∂y¯i
∂z
p′(y¯i)
)
− y¯1∂y¯
1
∂z
p′(y¯1) + z
∂y¯1 − y¯1
∂z
+ (y¯1 − y¯1)
− c∂y¯1
∂z
− ∂w¯1
∂z
D′(w¯1).
Notice that the first four right-hand side terms of this expression represent the marginal
social benefit of production while the last two terms are the marginal social cost of produc-
tion. Hence, the bilateral tariff reduction actually improves social welfare for country i (or
equivalently ∂SWi
∂z
(z) < 0) only when initially, the marginal social benefit is lower than the
marginal social cost of production.9
Proposition 5 then shows that when social welfare for a given country is concave, the
marginal social benefit is initially lower than the marginal social cost of production only
9The analysis done for Home can be repeated verbatim to obtain a similar result for Foreign.
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when the initial tariff is sufficiently large. In such a case, a tariff reduction increases welfare.
However, when the social welfare for a given country is convex, the marginal social benefit
is initially lower than the marginal social cost of production only when the initial tariff is
sufficiently small. In such a case, the tariff reduction raises welfare.
The outcomes of the tariff reduction on welfare differ from those of Section 3, which are
obtained with identical countries for three main reasons. When all the countries are identical,
for a given country, (i) in Equation 15, the second right-hand side term vanishes; (ii) the
total consumption is equal to the total production so that in Equation 15, the third right-
hand side term also vanishes; (iii) the tariff reduction always increases output. However, our
analysis suggests the price effect acts in a way that these results do not hold in the presence
of asymmetry.
We next extend the analysis done above to two layers of asymmetry. Countries are
identical within groups, but differ between groups by the number of firms in their industry.
In addition, the group sizes may also differ.
For the sake of tractability, assume that pollution is harmful enough and is perfectly
transboundary. As proved in the appendix, there exist critical values nss1 and n
∗∗
1 for the
industry size such that a tariff reduction raises the pollution taxes for countries in the first
group only when their industry size is sufficiently large (i.e., n1 > n
∗∗
1 ). Such a tariff
reduction increases the pollution taxes for countries in the second group only when the
industry size for countries in the other group is small (i.e., n1 < n
ss
1 ). These results are
similar to those of Proposition 3. Their particularity comes from the fact that the critical
values nss1 and n
∗∗
1 depend on the group sizes N1 and N2. On the other hand, output and
welfare are determined by the pollution taxes (see for instance, Equations 6g, 6h and 7b).
Consequently, the distribution of countries across groups impacts significantly the pollution
taxes, output and welfare, outcome of a tariff reduction.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the impacts of trade liberalization on equilibrium output, pol-
lution taxes and welfare. Unlike the existing literature, we have considered the multilateral
aspect of trade and have distinguished two types of countries according to the size of their
industry, with the number of countries of each type potentially different. We have proved
that asymmetry has a significant impact on the equilibrium outcome. This has been done by
comparing the outcomes derived in the asymmetric setting to those in the symmetric setting
where all the countries are identical.
In the symmetric setting, our results are similar to those obtained in Baksi and Chaudhuri
(2009). Trade liberalization always increases output. If the pollution is harmful enough,
countries will raise their environmental protection in response to trade liberalization as shown
in Proposition 1. Furthermore, as in Burguet and Sempere (2003), trade liberalization al-
ways increases welfare when we have to do with a local pollution problem.
However, when asymmetry exists, the price effect comes out, altering those strategic
interactions. In addition to the classical result of the symmetric model, trade liberalization
may actually increase output only for the countries in one of the two groups, while decreasing
output for the countries in the other group. Even if the pollution is harmful enough, it can
be optimal to soften environmental policies in response to trade liberalization. Moreover,
trade liberalization may not improve welfare even for strictly local pollution.
In this paper we have assumed an exogenous number of firms in each group of countries.
In a symmetric setting with clean goods, Horstmann and Markusen (1992) have shown that
allowing for endogenous firm location decisions might affect the analysis. Moreover, when
pre-liberalization tariff rates differed across countries, a multilateral reduction in tariff could
lead to different outcomes from those reported in this paper. Taking into account these
effects could be an avenue for new research. However, our results still highlight clearly that
asymmetry plays a crucial role in the outcome of trade liberalization.
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Appendix
The first-order conditions for the pollution taxes are:
∂SWj
∂tj
(tj(z), t−j(z), z) = 0 for all j ∈ N1 ∪N2. (16)
For a symmetric equilibrium in each group, we have: t1 = tj ∀j ∈ N1 and t2 = tk ∀k ∈ N2.
So, (16) can be rewritten as:
e1t1 + e2t2 = v1z + v2(a− c), (17a)
eˆ1t1 + eˆ2t2 = vˆ1z + vˆ2(a− c), (17b)
where
e1 = n
2
1N1(1 + 2n1N)/d
2 −Nn21(1 +N1)/d+NB1n1[1− λ+ λN1 + (1− λ)n2N2]/d;
e2 = n1n2N2(1 + 2n1N)/d
2 − n1n2N2N/d+NB1n2N2[λ− n1(1− λ)]/d;
eˆ1 = n1n2N1(1 + 2n2N)/d
2 − n1n2N1N/d+NB2n1N1[λ− n2(1− λ)]/d;
eˆ2 = n
2
2N2(1 + 2n2N)/d
2 −Nn22(1 +N2)/d+NB2n2[1− λ+ λN2 + (1− λ)n1N1]/d;
v1 = n1[1+n1(2N−1)]/d2+n1(1+n1−N−d)/d−(N−1)B1[(1−λ)n1+λ(n1N1+n2N2)]/d;
vˆ1 = n2[1+n2(2N−1)]/d2+n2(1+n2−N−d)/d−(N−1)B2[(1−λ)n2+λ(n1N1+n2N2)]/d;
v2 = −n1(1 + 2n1N)/d2 + n1(1 +N)/d+NB1[(1− λ)n1 + λ(n1N1 + n2N2)]/d;
vˆ2 = −n2(1 + 2n2N)/d2 + n2(1 +N)/d+NB2[(1− λ)n2 + λ(n1N1 + n2N2)]/d;
B1 = γNn1[−1 + (1− λ)(n1 − n1N1 − n2N2)]/d;
B2 = γNn2[−1 + (1− λ)(n2 − n1N1 − n2N2)]/d;
d = 1 + n1N1 + n2N2.
Solving (17a) and (17b), we get:
t1 = [z(v1eˆ2 − e2vˆ1) + (a− c)(v2eˆ2 − e2vˆ2)]/(e1eˆ2 − e2eˆ1),
t2 = [z(vˆ1e1 − eˆ1v1) + (a− c)(vˆ2e1 − eˆ1v2)]/(e1eˆ2 − e2eˆ1).
Impacts of the rent capture effect and the pollution shifting effect
In what follows, t1 and t2 are as defined in (8a) and (8b), respectively. The impact of
the rent capture effect for a country in group i is: RECi ≡ ti|γ=z=0 = −(a− c)/ni(N1+N2).
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The impact of the polluting shifting effect is defined as limni→∞ ti|z=0. If the number of
countries in group i = 1, 2 satisfies Ni > 1, then we will have
lim
ni→∞
ti|z=0 =
γ(a− c)(1− λ)(1− λ+ λ(N1 +N2))
1 + γ(1− λ)(1− λ+ λ(N1 +N2)) .
If Ni = 1, then we will have
lim
ni→∞
ti|z=0 =
γ(a− c)(1− λ)(1 + λNk)[Nk + γ(1− λ)(1 +Nk)2(1 + (1− λ)nkNk)]
Nk + γ(1− λ)(b0 + b1γ) ,
where,
b0 = 1− λ+ (3− λ+ (1− λ)nk)Nk + (1 + λ+ 2(1− λ)nk)N2k + (1− λ)nkN3k ,
b1 = (1− λ)(1 +Nk)2(1 + λNk)(1 + (1− λ)nkNk),
and where k = 1 if i ∈ N2; k = 2 if i ∈ N1.
Proof of Proposition 1
In what follows, ∂ts
∂z
is defined in (11). Since the denominator of ∂ts
∂z
is positive, that
fraction has the same sign as its numerator. Solving the equation ∂ts
∂z
= 0 with respect to λ,
we get two roots:
λ = [γnN(N − 1)(1 + n(N − 2))−
√
∆]/(2n2γN(N − 1)2),
λ = [γnN(N − 1)(1 + n(N − 2)) +
√
∆]/(2n2γN(N − 1)2),
where
∆ = Nγ(n(N − 1))2(Nγ(1 + nN)2 − 4(1 + nN(1 + n))).
The above roots are real if and only if ∆ ≥ 0. This last condition is equivalent to
γ ≥ 4(1 + nN(1 + n))
N(1 + nN)2
≡ γ1.
In such a case, the roots satisfy: λ ≤ λ. Furthermore λ ≥ 0 if and only if
γ ≤ 1 + nN(1 + n)
nN(1 + n(N − 1)) ≡ γ2
and λ ≤ 1 if and only if
γ ≤ 1 + nN(1 + n)
nN2
≡ γ3
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Since n ≥ 1, and N ≥ 2 we have:
γ2
γ3
=
N
1 + n(N − 1) ≤
N
1 + (N − 1) = 1.
We also have:
γ1
γ2
=
4n(1 + n(N − 1))
(1 + nN)2
≡ g(n).
So, in order to show that γ1 ≤ γ2, it suffices to prove that g is bounded above by 1. Since
we have: g′(n) = 4/(1 + nN)2 > 0, limn→+∞g(n) is an upper bound for g. But we have
limn→+∞g(n) = 4(N − 1)/N2 < 1, the result then follows. The above inequalities suggest
that γ1 ≤ γ2 ≤ γ3.
Notice that the numerator of ∂ts
∂z
is a second degree polynomial in λ. Hence, if we have
γ < γ1, then
∂ts
∂z
> 0. When γ ∈ [γ1, γ2], we get ∂ts∂z > 0 if and only if λ ≤ λ or λ ≥ λ. When
γ ∈ [γ2, γ3], the condition ∂ts∂z > 0 holds if and only if λ ≥ λ. If we have γ > γ3, then ∂ts∂z < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using (8a), (8b) for λ = 1, we get:
∂t1
∂z
=
2 + 2n31 + 8n2 + 5n
2
2 + 2n1n2(3 + n2) + 4γa1(n1)
4n1(1 + n1 + n2)(2 + 4γ + n1 + n2)
, (18a)
∂t2
∂z
=
2 + n22(2 + n2) + n
2
1(5 + 2n2) + n1(8 + 6n2 + 4n
2
2) + 4γa2(n1)
4n2(1 + n1 + n2)(2 + 4γ + n1 + n2)
, (18b)
where a1(n1) = −4n21−n1(5+2n2)+n2(3+2n2) and a2(n1) = 2n21+n1(3−2n2)−n2(5+4n2).
Set n¯1(n2) ≡ [−5−2n2+
√
25 + 68n2 + 36n22]/4 the positive root of the equation a1(n1) = 0.
We have: a1(n1) ≥ 0 if and only if n1 ∈ [1, n¯1(n2)]. Likewise, set n˜1(n2) ≡ [−3 + 2n2 +√
9 + 28n2 + 36n22]/4 the positive root of: a2(n1) = 0. We have a2(n1) ≥ 0 if and only if
n1 ≥ n˜1(n2). The above results suggest that for n1 ∈ [1, n¯1(n2)], we have a1(n1) ≥ 0, which by
(18a) implies that ∂t1
∂z
> 0. If the inequality n1 > n¯1(n2) holds, then a1(n1) < 0. Hence,
∂t1
∂z
>
0 if and only if γ < γ¯ ≡ [2+2n31+8n2+5n22+2n1n2(3+n2)]/4[4n21+n1(5+2n2)−n2(3+2n2)].
The results (i) and (ii) then follow.
If we have n1 ≥ n˜1(n2), then a2(n1) ≥ 0. In such a case, by (18b) we get ∂t2∂z > 0. However,
if we have n1 < n˜1(n2), then a2(n1) < 0 so that using (18b) we obtain:
∂t2
∂z
> 0 if and only if
22
γ < γ˜ ≡ [2+n22(2+n2)+n21(5+2n2)+n1(8+6n2+4n22)]/4[n1(−2n1+2n2−3)+n2(5+4n2)].
The results (iii) and (iv) then follow.
Proof that a bilateral tariff reduction always increases the pollution taxes when
pollution is harmful enough and 0 ≤ λ < 1
Making use of (8a), (8b), we show that:
∂t1
∂z
= [−8γ2(1− λ2)n1(1 + (1− λ)n1)(1 + (1− λ)n2)(1 + n1 + n2) + s1γ + s2]/f,
∂t2
∂z
= [−8γ2(1− λ2)n2(1 + (1− λ)n1)(1 + (1− λ)n2)(1 + n1 + n2) + s3γ + s4]/f˜ ,
where si, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 are terms depending on n1, n2, and λ, whereas f and f˜ are positive
terms. When γ is sufficiently large, the signs of ∂t1
∂z
and ∂t2
∂z
are those of their respective
coefficients of γ2, which are negative for 0 ≤ λ < 1. The result then follows.
Proof of Proposition 4
Differentiating (6g) and (6h) with respect to z, we get: (a) ∂y1
∂z
< 0 if and only if
h1 ≡ ∂t1∂z − n21+n2 .∂t2∂z + 12(1+n2) > 0; (b)
∂y2
∂z
< 0 if and only if h2 ≡ ∂t2∂z − n11+n1 .∂t1∂z + 12(1+n1) > 0.
Making use of (8a) and (8b), we obtain:
h1 =
−(1 + 8γ)n21 + 4n1(−3γ + n2) + 4(2 + 3γ)n2 + (5 + 8γ)n22 + 2
4n1(1 + n2)(2 + 4γ + n1 + n2)
,
h2 =
(5 + 8γ)n21 + 4n1(2 + 3γ + n2) + 2− (1 + 8γ)n22 − 12γn2
4n2(1 + n1)(2 + 4γ + n1 + n2)
.
These expressions have positive denominator. As a result, their sign is given by that of their
respective numerators.
(i) Clearly, h1 > 0 if and only if 1 ≤ n1 < nˆ1(n2), where nˆ1(n2) is the positive root of the
equation: −(1 + 8γ)n21 + 4n1(−3γ + n2) + (4(2 + 3γ)n2 + (5 + 8γ)n22 + 2) = 0.
(ii) Likewise, h2 > 0 if and only if n1 > n˘1(n2), where n˘1(n2) is the positive root of the
equation:
(5 + 8γ)n21 + 4n1(2 + 3γ + n2) + 2− (1 + 8γ)n22 − 12γn2 = 0. (19)
Notice that when 0 ≤ n2 ≤ n¯2 ≡ [−6γ +
√
2(1 + 8γ + 8γ2)]/(1 + 8γ), we have:
2 − (1 + 8γ)n22 − 12γn2 ≥ 0, which implies: h2 ≥ 0. As a result, we can set n˘1(n2) = 0 in
order to get the desired outcome.
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A numerical example for n1 = 1, n2 = 2, N1 = N2 = 1 and arbitrary values of a, c, γ
and λ.
For n1 = 1, n2 = 2, N1 = N2 = 1 and arbitrary values of a, c, γ and λ, using (8a) and
(8b), we get:
∂t1
∂z
= [69 + 2γ(117− 204λ+ 89λ2)− 32γ2(1− λ2)(3− 2λ)(2− λ)]/16ρ(λ, γ), (20a)
∂t2
∂z
= [67 + 2γ(278− 632λ+ 254λ2)− 64γ2(1− λ2)(3− 2λ)(2− λ)]/32ρ(λ, γ), (20b)
where ρ(λ, γ) = 5 + γ(29− 36λ+ 11λ2) + 4γ2(1− λ2)(3− 2λ)(2− λ) > 0.
The analysis of the signs of (20a) and (20b) can be carried out by distinguishing two
cases of transboundary pollution.
The first case is for totally global pollution (i.e. λ = 1). In this case, we get (a) ∂t1
∂z
> 0
and (b) ∂t2
∂z
> 0 if and only if γ < 0.67. Thus, while a tariff reduction lowers the pollution
tax in Home even if pollution is harmful enough, it lowers the pollution tax in Foreign only
when γ < 0.67.
The second case is for partially global pollution (i.e. 0 ≤ λ < 1). In this situation,
for i = 1, 2, set γˆi(λ) the positive root of the equation
∂ti
∂z
= 0. We have ∂ti
∂z
> 0 if and
only if 0 ≤ γ < γˆi(λ). Hence, a tariff reduction lowers the pollution taxes in all the
countries if and only if 0 ≤ γ < min(γˆ1(λ), γˆ2(λ)). It raises the pollution taxes in all the
countries when γ > max(γˆ1(λ), γˆ2(λ)). It raises the pollution tax but only in one country
for γ ∈ (min(γˆ1(λ), γˆ2(λ)),max(γˆ1(λ), γˆ2(λ))).
We next examine the effects of the tariff reduction on output.
∂y1
∂z
= (−45− 4γ(41− 55λ+ 23λ2))/8ρ(λ, γ),
∂y2
∂z
= (−19 + 2γ(−69 + 128λ− 4λ2))/8ρ(λ, γ).
Notice that we have ∂y1
∂z
< 0. Therefore, the tariff reduction always increases output in
Home.
It can be shown that ∂y2
∂z
> 0 if and only γ > γex(λ) ≡ 192(−69+128λ−4λ2) and λ > 0.69.
Hence, the tariff reduction lowers output in Foreign for λ > 0.69 and γ > γex(λ).
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Proof that ∂t1
∂z
< 0 for n1 > n
∗∗
1 and
∂t2
∂z
< 0 for n1 < n
ss
1 when pollution is harmful
enough and λ = 1.
Using (8a) and (8b) for arbitrary values of N1, N2 and λ = 1 yields:
∂t1
∂z
=
b0(n1)γ + b1
n1d[(γ + n1)N21 +N2(1 + n2(N2 − 1) + γN2) +N1(1 + n1(N2 − 1) + (2γ + n2)N2)]
,
∂t2
∂z
=
c0(n1)γ + c1
n2d[(γ + n1)N21 +N2(1 + n2(N2 − 1) + γN2) +N1(1 + n1(N2 − 1) + (2γ + n2)N2)]
,
where b1 and c1 do not depend on γ; b0(n1) and c0(n1) are second degree polynomials in n1
defined as
b0(n1) = −n21N1[N21 + N2(2N2 − 1) + N1(3N2 − 1)] + n1[−N21 + (−2 + n2(1 − 2N2))N22 +
N1(1 + (−3 + n2)N2 − 2n2N22 ] + n2N2(1 +N(1 + n2N2)),
c0(n1) = N
2
1Nn
2
1 + n1N1[1− 2n2N21 +N1(1 + n2(1− 2N2))− n2[(1 + n2N2)(N2 +2N21 − 1) +
N1N2(3 + n2(3N2 − 1))].
Denote by n∗∗1 the positive roots of the equation b0(n1) = 0 of and by n
ss
1 the positive
root of c0(n1) = 0. We have: (i) when pollution is harmful enough,
∂t1
∂z
and ∂t2
∂z
have the
same sign as b0(n1) and c0(n1), respectively; (ii) b0(n1) < 0 if and only if n1 > n
∗∗
1 ; (iii)
c0(n1) < 0 if and only if n1 < n
ss
1 . The result then follows.
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